Airprox 2024294 – What Really Occurred? – sUAS Information

On the evening of 22 November 2024 at 21:51 UTC, a Nationwide Police Air Service (NPAS) EC135 helicopter working close to RAF Lakenheath reported a number of “drones” manoeuvring round it. In actuality, the objects have been USAF F15 fighters engaged in authorised evening coaching in Class G airspace (floor–FL150), coordinated by Lakenheath Strategy (“Overlord”).

Abstract of Key Details:

• Closest Level of Strategy (CPA): 1 NM horizontal / 1900 ft vertical separation (recorded).
• ATC Providers:
  • EC135 – Primary Service (no site visitors data assured).
  • F-15s – Visitors Service (obtained details about the EC135).
• Misidentification Elements:
  • EC135’s TCAS did not show the F-15s.
  • F-15 lighting did not resemble commonplace civil plane lighting.
  • The crew believed the lights have been drones resulting from their obvious behaviour and lack of TCAS affirmation.

The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) concluded that there was no danger of collision (Threat Class E) and attributed the report back to misidentification and situational consciousness breakdown reasonably than unsafe flying.

Why This Issues to Drone Operators

1. Misidentification Threat

Even skilled police aircrew utilizing EO/IR cameras mistook navy jets for drones. This exhibits how simply drone operators may be blamed for aerial occasions they weren’t concerned in.

2. Digital Conspicuity Limitations

The EC135’s TCAS didn’t detect the F-15s regardless of them squawking Modes A and C. This highlights the continuing limitations of EC techniques in complicated or mixed-use airspace, significantly at evening.

3. ATC Service Ranges – Know the Distinction

Below a Primary Service, ATC is not required to offer site visitors data. Drone operators ought to think about requesting a Visitors Service or Deconfliction Service for BVLOS, city, or delicate operations.

Public Notion: A Persistent Problem

• “Drone blame” is the default: Unidentified lights within the sky are sometimes assumed to be drones, fuelling public concern and regulatory overreaction.
• Poor understanding of airspace guidelines: The general public typically assumes ATC sees and controls every little thing — which is unfaithful in Class G.
• Coordination gaps: The police helicopter tasking was not pre-notified to the USAF. This exhibits the necessity for higher operational coordination.

Threat Evaluation for UK Drone Operations

Potential Situations and Threat Ranges:

• Misidentification by different plane:
  • Chance: Medium
  • Severity: Low to Medium
  • Threat Degree: Average general, however Excessive reputationally
• No site visitors data beneath Primary Service:
  • Chance: Medium
  • Severity: Medium
  • Threat Degree: Average
• Public/media backlash from perceived near-miss:
  • Chance: Excessive
  • Severity: Excessive
  • Threat Degree: Excessive (particularly for industrial operators)

Key Mitigations for Drone Operators:

• Use twin EC techniques (ADS-B OUT and ground-based detect-and-avoid).
• Preserve a telemetry and flight log archive for each operation.
• Pre-notify navy ATC when working close to MOD airspace.
• File CANPs, NOTAMs, or Short-term Hazard Areas when relevant.
• Practice pilots to request an improve to Visitors Service the place required.

Authorized and Regulatory Observations

• SERA.3205 and ANO Article 239 set the usual for proximity legal responsibility. Maintain compliance well-documented.
• Anticipate rising stress for obligatory digital conspicuity, with incidents like this cited in coverage.
• If blamed in media or police statements with out proof, drone operators might have grounds for defamation or financial loss claims. Get authorized recommendation promptly.

Ultimate Ideas

This wasn’t a drone incident — however it might have been perceived as one.

The lesson? Management the narrative by controlling the information.
Document every little thing. Safe it. Share it when mandatory. With the best proof, drone operators can defend themselves from false blame and assist enhance UK airspace security.

In regards to the Writer

Richard Ryan is a UK barrister and aviation lawyer specialising in drone regulation, UAS integration, and counter-drone legislation. A Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, he advises police forces, authorities our bodies, and industrial operators on airspace compliance and rising UTM frameworks. He’s additionally finishing a PhD on airspace integration and unmanned site visitors administration at Cranfield College.